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ABSTRACT There has been much recent work on fraud and Anti Money Laundering (AML) detection using
machine learning techniques. However, most algorithms are based on supervised techniques. Studies show
that supervised techniques often have the limitation of not adapting well to new irregular fraud patterns when
the dataset is highly imbalanced. Instead, unsupervised learning can have a better capability to find anomalous
and irregular patterns in new transaction. Despite this, unsupervised techniques also have the disadvantage
of not being able to give state-of-the-art detection results. We propose a suite of unsupervised and deep
learning techniques to implement an anti-money laundering and fraud detection system to resolve this
limitation. The system leverages three deep learning models: autoencoder (AE), variational autoencoder
(VAE), and a generative adversarial network. We preprocess the given dataset to separate the Transaction
Date attribute into its base components to capture time-related fraud patterns. Also, Wasserstein Generative
Adversarial Network (WGAN) is used to generate fraud transactions, which are then mixed with the base
dataset to form a more balanced mixed dataset. These two datasets are used to train the AE and VAE models.
We built two versions of the AE model (single-loss and multi-loss) besides a novel method of calculating the
anomaly score threshold, called Recall-First Threshold (RFT), which helps enhance the model’s performance.
Experimental results demonstrated that the False Positive Rate (FPR) drops down to as low as 7% in the
proposed multi-loss AE model. In comparison, we achieved an accuracy of 93%, with 100% of the fraud
transactions recalled successfully.
INDEX TERMS Anti-money laundering (AML), Autoencoders, Anomaly detection, Deep learning, Fraud
detection, GANs, Unsupervised learning.

I. INTRODUCTION

Money laundering involves concealing or disguising the
origin of illegal profits that have been generated from
criminal acts [1]. Banking products or services can be
exploited to transfer criminal proceeds for terrorist financing
and money laundering. These institutions become a direct or
indirect victim of money laundering activity, which
undermines the integrity of the financial system [2]. In light
of this, the pressure on financial institutions and banks to
improve their measures to fight money laundering is
increasing. Similarly, central banks and finance-related laws
have become stricter towards money laundering crimes such
that banks need to follow specific rules; otherwise, they
could be penalized or even closed [3]. One recent case
includes the largest bank in Italy, Unicredit, which was fined
$1.3 billion for using the US financial system to launder
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about $6.76 billion [4]. In another case, the UK-based
banking giant, Standard Chartered, paid more than $1 billion
in fines and settlements for helping in money laundering [5].
Lastly, as a result of compliance failures in the firm’s antimoney laundering program, Morgan Stanley was fined $10
million [6].
Nevertheless, most banks still adopt systems that comprise
a set of predefined if-then-else rules called “Rule-based
systems” to detect incoming and outgoing suspicious
transactions. This system requires a manual process of
checking for each transaction that has triggered the static
rules. Human experts define rule-based systems; hence, they
embed their own working experience into the automated
decision process. In future updates, more exceptions and
rules are necassary, which may impair system performance.
Additionally, those systems have a minimal ability to detect
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suspicious transactions by groups of people across different
economic activities. This is because rule-based systems do
not consider the economic activities of different people.
Furthermore, acquiring economic knowledge about different
groups of people can be tedious work on its own [7, 8].
While banks and financial institutions seek cost-effective
means of complying with regulatory requirements, they face
responsibility for evaluating larger, more complex, and
faster-growing datasets, necessitating more powerful
analytical tools to efficiently monitor the financial sector.
Machine learning algorithms enable cheaper and more
accessible tools that are increasingly powerful as they make
sophisticated real-time insights on larger datasets possible.
These algorithms and tools can be used in the anti-money
laundering process by the anticipation and detection of fraud
and suspicious transactions [9]. However, adopting machine
learning to detect money laundering has long been in
research, using different methods and techniques that will be
covered in detail in the literature review section.
The current performance of machine learning techniques
in the anti-money laundering field is acceptable. However, a
lot of work is still required to enhance and optimize those
models in terms of performance, namely the so-called “falsepositive rate,” which indicates the regular transactions that
have been identified as fraud. The system will decline these
transactions or delay them for further investigation. In some
cases, false positives might be costing vendors much more
than the fraud transactions themselves. It has been reported
that even rule-based systems still struggle with about 20%
false-positive rates wherein only 1 in 5 transactions marked
by the system as fraud is genuinely fraud [10].
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We design and implement deep learning models with
promising results in terms of the FPR, RFT, and AUC for
fraud detection.
2. We present recent state-of-the-art deep learning and
unsupervised learning techniques, namely, the
autoencoder (AE), variational autoencoder (VAE), and
generative adversarial network (GAN) to improve the
anti-money laundering (AML) process.
3. For the first time, we demonstrate the applicability and
effectiveness of combining AE/VAE with WGAN
methods. Particularly, the WGAN generates realistic
synthetic fraud transactions to solve the issue of
imbalanced class labels, and such additional transactions
are then used by the AE/VAE to train the model. The
results indicate that this approach offers significant
improvements for fraud detection.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the related literature. Various deep learning
architectures used in this study are described in Section 3.
Proposed methodology and experimental results are
presented in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Finally, Section
6 concludes the article with a discussion of future work.

2

II. RELATED WORK

Decision Trees (DTs) are one of the common supervised
learning algorithms that are used to identify money
laundering cases. Rojas et al. [11] utilized DTs and Decision
rules by selecting Random Forest (RF), Random-Tree, and
J48graft from the DT algorithms group and decision table
JRip from the Decision rules algorithms. MABS (MultiAgent-Based Simulation) was used to generate synthetic data
that simulates mobile money transactions. JRip generated
about 0.999 true positives and only 0.012 false positives,
which was one of the best accuracies obtained. Despite this
accuracy, the research was based on synthetic data that may
not reflect real suspicious case situations. The accuracy
results may differ when used on real transaction data.
Sahin and Duman [12] proposed DT models such as C5.0,
CART, and CHAID combined with SVM (Support Vector
Machine), which utilizes various kernel functions, such as
radial basis, linear, polynomial, and sigmoid. The proposed
model was implemented in a credit card fraud detection
system. These classification models were compared using a
real dataset provided by a bank. However, due to the highly
imbalanced records (i.e., a ratio of 20,000 normal
transactions to 1 suspicious transaction), the author
performed stratified sampling to under-sample the normal
transactions. The result presented in the paper shows that
both CART and C5.0 have the highest accuracy of detecting
suspicious transactions at more than 90%. However, the
research did not evaluate the false positive rate; furthermore,
SVM offers 89% accuracy, but the author indicated that
SVM tends to suffer from over-fitting.
Bitmap Index-based DT (BIDT) algorithm was
implemented by Jayasree and Balan [13] to evaluate the
adaptability risk for money laundering. Results of false
positive and true positive rates, alongside the adaptability
rate and risk identification time, showed that the proposed
approach outperformed other methods. Also, the authors in
[14] used DT to assign a risk score to each customer profile
that represents their tendency to perform money laundering,
using four types of attributes: industry, location, business
size, and product type to build the decision tree. Each
attribute, including the class label, can accept three risk
values (high, middle, low). However, changes in the
predefined risk values will cause the decision tree model to
become inaccurate. Moreover, each type of attribute value
must be assigned with a risk rank, and this will require
domain experts to label those attributes correctly. Otherwise,
any changes to the training set will require the decision tree
to be trained again.
Recently, SVM [15] and ANN (artificial neural networks)
[16] were used and compared against RF and other
algorithms. Experimental results show that ANN performed
better when compared to other algorithms. Radial-Basis
function network (RBFN) is another approach that is used to
examine suspicious transactions. Lin-Tao et al. [17]
proposed an updated version of RBFN utilizing the APC-III
algorithm to optimize parameter learning in the hidden layer.
Additionally, RLS (Recursive Least Square) algorithm was
introduced to improve model convergence. A real bank
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dataset containing 70 suspicious instances was used to train
the network. The experiment resulted in a low false-positive
rate, close to 0%, and a detection rate higher than 80%.
Although this implementation shows an excellent false
positive rate, the model’s accuracy can further be enhanced.
Benford’s Law and machine learning algorithms (ANN,
DT, RF) were used to investigate money laundering patterns
in real Spanish court cases [18]. The authors used Benford’s
law to map accounting records for each supplier to 21dimensional space. Results showed that even more
companies could be marked as a risk, but this approach still
required a domain expert in accounting to do the feature
engineering. Chouiekh and Haj [19] proposed a deep
convolution neural network (DCNN) to detect fraud cases
and obtained results outperforming the traditional machine
learning techniques such as SVM and RF.
Due to the lack of genuinely suspicious transaction data
and the sensitivity of these data, many researchers have
resolved to use synthetic data or simulated data in the
training set to reduce the class imbalance issue. However,
such an approach may not truly reflect real-world money
laundering cases, potentially causing a generalization issue.
Supervised techniques require a domain expert to label the
data and to help in feature engineering. Therefore, more
researchers have recently turned to unsupervised learning
methods to deal with the money laundering implementation
problem.
Zhang et al. [20] utilized a clustering algorithm to detect
money laundering. The authors extracted all the suspicious
individuals (n) related to suspicious cases identified by an
investigator. Then the author assembled the transactions that
those individuals made in n+2 dimensional Euclidean space,
where time represents the first dimension and transactions
represent the second dimension. Then, to reduce the
clustering problem, the timeline was discretized into various
time instances. By doing so, each transaction is viewed as a
node in one-dimension time-space. To make the problem
even more straightforward, the transaction frequency or the
money amount was accumulated in each timeline instance.
Finally, the histogram segmentation was conducted using a
k-means algorithm where each segmented histogram
represents a single cluster k. The abnormal hills in the
histogram are used to identify suspicious cases. Using only
the transactions data, the proposed method managed to
match the different transactions with their peers without
other features, such as occupation or business size. However,
the segmented histograms are only limited to transactions
that occurred on the same time instance. The histograms are
not able to uncover activities of money laundering that may
occur through multiple time instances. Capturing those time
instances can be a difficult task in such an approach.
Lune et al. [21] used the K-Nearest Neighbor (k-NN)
approach, which has shown a good performance. A public
domain dataset was used that was generated from a BTS
(Banking Transaction Simulator) to simulate shell
companies’ behavior. These are companies that seem to be
genuine, while their primary objective is to launder money.
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The author assigned an anomaly score for each data point
called LOF (Local Outlier Factor), which is the data point's
ratio and its average density of the k-NNs. This approach
assumes that an outlier would be significantly lower than its
nearest neighbors while the genuine data point would have a
similar density. Finally, they set the LOF threshold to 0.9,
which will mark all data points above it as a shell company.
The problem with this approach is the sensitivity to the
outliers, where it can cause variation in density for the data
points.
Claudio and Balsa [22] chose to use numerical and
nominal attributes in K-means cluster development despite
K-means performance on nominal attributes being
inefficient in its use of squared Euclidian-distance to
calculate proximity. However, the data were clustered by
customer attributes to build a customer profiles table, and
then the PART algorithm was used for rule generation. The
initial 3 month period produced unsatisfactory results. After
expanding the client profiles to cover one year and including
more attributes, the algorithm showed a better result.
Nevertheless, the authors did not mention how they deal with
the imbalanced data as k-NN does not perform well on an
unbalanced dataset. Another research [23] tried to produce
clusters that are more understandable. The authors attempted
to add a meaningful description before clustering by
following
the
Apriori
and
LINGO
algorithm
implementations to identify fraud in credit card transactions.
Following this, they compared the results from both
algorithms with other clustering algorithms such as k-NN.
Using simulated test transactions, their results showed that
the LINGO algorithm quickly generated more meaningful
patterns that can be used in near real-time transactions.
Using one-class SVM, Tang and Yin [24] proposed
another unsupervised approach to recognize normal and
suspicious human transaction behaviors. An improved RBF
kernel-based function was implemented over 1.2 million
records obtained from Wuhan Agriculture Bank, China, with
30 simulated suspicious transactions. Results showed that
the proposed RBF kernel enhanced the algorithm speed and
accuracy. However, the proposed solution has only 69.13%
accuracy in detecting doubtful cases, which may indicate
impracticality when applied in the real world. Furthermore,
the suspicious cases are synthetic records that may not fully
reflect real suspicious cases.
Recent research [25] tried to avoid the sensitivity of OCSVM (one-class SVM) for the noise and outliers existence in
the dataset by introducing a sparse and robust methodology
of fraud detection. The authors introduced the Ramp-loss
function to the original OC-SVM. Hence, they called it
Ramp-OCSVM. The advantage of implementing the ramploss function's non-convexity nature and the concave-convex
procedure was the proposed algorithm’s ability to solve nonconvex, non-differentiable optimization problems. When
they compared the proposed approach against other methods,
such as OC-SVM and ROCSVM, the results showed that
their system presented the best performance within an
acceptable false-positive rate. Another research [26]
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proposed a special case that tried to overcome the OC-SVM
shortcoming of ignoring the training data's inner-class
structure. The proposed method attempted to minimize the
scatteredness of the training points; hence, the points can be
easily separated from the origin. The modified version is
called OC-WCSSVM (within-class scatter OC-SVM), a
typical OC-SVM except that it's β = 0. The result showed
that the proposed method is more accurate for anomaly
detection than other approaches such as PCA and
Geometrical Driven Diagnosis (GDD).
Wilson and Martinez [27] proposed the usage of an
improved RBF (Radial Basis Function) kernel-based
function that uses various distance metric functions. They
introduced three distance functions: HVDM (Heterogeneous
Value Difference Metric), IVDM (Interpolated Value
Difference Metric), and WVDM (Windowed Value
Difference Metric). These functions can be used with k-NN
for a wide range of implementations. Results showed that
WVDM and IVDM produced higher accuracy than HVDMs.
Chitra and Subashini [28] estimated the proportion for
each bank customer using EM (Expectation Maximization)
algorithm. They used the probability density function
Gaussian-Mixture Model to model the previous transaction’s
behavior for each bank customer and compare them against
the current transaction’s behavior. The main issue with this
method is that it requires the assumption that statistical
distribution (i.e., Gaussian distribution) of the dataset is
used. Furthermore, for the EM algorithm to work in the first
place, we need to define the number of clusters required and
estimate and maximize the different clusters’ data points. For
instance, in the two clusters experiment, the EM algorithm
assumed that every single cluster represents a different
Gaussian distribution with its own function parameters.
Cao and Do [29] attempted to attack money by moving
money in a circular pattern between accounts. They used the
CLOPE (clustering with sLOPE) algorithm to check small
amounts of money distributed to various recipients. It also
checks a single account for collecting money from different
senders. Moreover, the CLOPE algorithm's main
characteristic is the acceptance of nominal variables. Hence,
continuous variables such as the transaction-amount need to
be discretized and assigned to a meaningful label. The
research used a dataset consisting of 12,350 normal records
from an unspecified bank to measure CLOPE’s performance
in detecting money laundering. Furthermore, 25 simulated
suspicious records were inserted into the dataset to test the
algorithm. The experimental result showed that the detection
rate was about 100%, with only 25% of the false-positive
rate. Despite this, each cluster produced by CLOPE must be
thoroughly examined to determine which cluster belongs to
which type of money laundering case, which would require
intervention from domain experts. Furthermore, data
discretization requires a user to provide the number of bins,
and the author did not mention which method they used to
get the optimal bin number.
Zaslavsky and Strizhak [30] employed SOM (Selforganizing map) to detect credit card fraud transactions.
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Specifically, the authors used SOM to create a customer
behavior model on credit card transactions. The idea behind
the proposed model is to detect suspicious transactions when
a customer deviates from his usual transaction behavior. In
this approach, two profiles are created from the SOM
algorithm, namely the normal behavior model and the
fraudster behavior model, Each incoming transaction is then
compared with both models, and, subsequently, the
transaction similarity score is calculated for both models.
The issue here is that a predefined threshold must be set to
compare it against the similarity score. Also, to keep the
models updated, newly encountered behaviors (i.e., either
suspicious or normal) are used to re-train both models. This,
in turn, may cause over-fitting for these models. Another
research [31] proposed an improved version of SOM to
overcome the large presence of outliers in the dataset. The
author then compared his proposed method result against the
K-prototypes algorithm. The research concluded that the
improved SOM is better than the K-prototypes algorithm as
it gives better results, especially in handling the outliers.
However, interpreting results from SOM is a complicated
process as it is not transparent.
To identify suspicious transactions, the authors in [32]
proposed a sequence-matching algorithm. The idea of this
algorithm is to extract a sequence of daily transactions within
a certain peer group. Then, using a probabilistic model, it
identifies the high-risk sequence within the extracted
sequence. Later these sequences are compared against the
transaction’s history for each account. Each high-risk
sequence is given a similarity score by implementing
Euclidean similarity distance. Those assigned scores are then
separated based on manual threshold scores to extract the
suspicious sequence. However, having a predefined
threshold is not an optimal solution as it may vary between
different accounts. Moreover, in the real world, the number
of suspicious sequences is unidentified. Hence, having a high
threshold value might lead to a low false positive rate and
might miss some suspicious transactions. Alternatively,
having a low threshold might increase compliance officers'
workload to verify each case and increase the false positive
rate.
Another study [33] leveraged the semi-supervised
learning approach, which uses both supervised and
unsupervised algorithms. The proposed framework used
artificial neural network (ANN) and k-NN clustering to
investigate money laundering in an investment bank. The
framework first consolidated the transactions on a monthly,
weekly, and daily basis. By performing k-NN clustering over
these transactions to locate the suspicious transactions, each
suspicious transaction was labeled “suspicious” while others
are marked as “normal.” Following this, the ANN is trained
using these labeled transactions to generate the model. To
obtain enough suspicious transactions, the author used a
genetic algorithm to generate more synthetic suspicious
transactions like those that were detected from the k-NN
clustering process. Once the training phase is done using
these suspicious transactions, the trained model is then used
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to test any new transaction to determine whether it is
suspicious or not. However, this approach still requires a
domain expert to identify and label the suspicious
transactions during the clustering phase. A heuristic
approach is used to define the number of clusters during the
clustering phase.
Shabat et al. [34] proposed two algorithms: geometrybased extraction, called Diffusion Maps (DM), and matrix
decomposition. They deal with high-dimensional big data
(HDBD), which is critical in cybersecurity. The result
showed that the proposed approach could outperform the
nearest neighbor-based (k-NN) and the clustering-based
(uCBLOF) algorithms. However, a massive dataset is
required for this approach to be efficient.
To identify the relationship between different accounts
involved in the money laundering process, Shaikh and Nazir
[35] implemented clustering using social networks analysis
(SNA) that determines specific relations among illegal
transactions and suspicious customers. However, the authors
used fixed conditions and criteria to identify various types of
relationships, which may not be ideal for generalization.
Therefore, these conditions will need to be modified and
updated for each geo-social zone.
Colladon and Remondi [36] proposed a similar approach
to build a risk profile by using multiple networks during the
experiment. However, they focused only on factories and the
business sector, which may lead to less generalization when
applied to personal bank networks. Also, they neglect certain
features from their analysis, such as the size and the age of
the firms. Another related approach proposed by Molloy et
al. [37] used graph analytic and BIRCH (Balanced Iterative
Reducing and Clustering using Hierarchies). The proposed
method used the SCC (Strongly Connected Component) to
reduce the false-positives and efficiently identify suspicious
transactions. SCC theory assumes that transactions within an
SCC are less likely to be fraudulent than the transactions that
span two SCCs. Although the proposed method showed good
discrimination between normal transactions and suspicious
ones, the implementation still requires high computational
cost.
A powerful unsupervised deep learning approach was
recently proposed based on variational autoencoders (VAE)
for anomaly detection [38]. The VAE's main advantage over
PCA and the standard autoencoder is that it delivers a
probability measure as an anomaly score rather than a
reconstruction error. The result showed that the proposed
method performed better than PCA and standard
autoencoder-based methods. Furthermore, given its
generative nature, analyzing the anomaly's underlying cause
is also possible through data reconstruction. However,
reconstruction probability still requires a fixed threshold, and
it can be easily affected by outliers. Furthermore, it still
needs to be validated against real money laundering cases. In
another similar effort [39], an autoencoder-based data
augmentation technique was presented for unsupervised
anomaly detection. Babaei et al. [40] proposed a prune-based
outlier factor (PLOF) approach for the detection of point
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outliers which can significantly reduce the execution time of
local outlier factor (LOF) while maintaining performance.
Another research [41] proposed unary classification with
deep autoencoder, which used the OCC (One Class
Classification) to identify only one class among all data
objects. Results showed better accuracy and performance
over the other traditional machine learning algorithms.
However, as it is only one class, it is hard to identify the
attribute that contributes the most to the separation of
positive and negative classes.
Pumsirirat and Yan [42] used the Restricted Boltzmann
Machine (RBM) and autoencoders to detect credit card
fraud. By using RBM, the model can reconstruct the normal
transactions to locate fraud. Having both algorithms enabled
them to investigate the real-time transactions, the
experiments were conducted over three datasets from
Australia, Germany, and Europe. The results showed a low
false-positive rate besides a good performance.
Paula et al. [43] used autoencoders to investigate fraud and
money laundering in Brazilian exports. The authors used a
dataset containing 820 thousand records and conducted the
experiments using PCA and autoencoders. Results showed
that autoencoder could detect fraud even with high latent
dimensions while PCA could not achieve the same effect.
In conclusion, clustering approaches are simple but still
require a domain expert to determine the number of clusters
and analyze each cluster's members to determine the
suspicious ones. However, clustering algorithms focus on
grouping similar transactions based on each transaction's
characteristics, so the imbalance dataset issue does not
heavily impact it (e.g., a ratio of 20,000 normal transactions
to 1 suspicious transaction). Additionally, recent advances in
deep learning techniques such as autoencoders and their
promising results in anomaly detection make it an excellent
candidate for implementation in this research.
III. DEEP LEARNING MODELS

In this section, we describe autoencoders (AEs),
Variational Autoencoders (VAEs), Generative Adversarial
Networks (GANs), and Wasserstein GANs (WGANs).
Autoencoders are an unsupervised learning method that is
mainly used for feature extraction. They use a feedforward,
non-recurrent neural network to perform representation
learning. An autoencoder will learn the representation or
code by trying to copy the input to output. However, using
an autoencoder is not as simple as copying the input to
output; otherwise, the neural network would not uncover the
hidden structure in the input distribution. An autoencoder
will encode the input distribution into a low-dimensional
tensor, which usually takes the form of a vector. This will
approximate the hidden structure that is commonly referred
to as the latent representation, code, or vector. This process
constitutes the encoding part. The decoder part will then
decode the latent vector to recover the original input. As a
result of the latent vector being a low-dimensional,
compressed representation of the input distribution, it should
be expected that the output recovered by the decoder can
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only approximate the input. The dissimilarity between the
input and the output can be measured by a loss function.
A. AUTOENCODERS (AEs)

An autoencoder consists of input, hidden (or bottleneck), and
output layers. Although it is a single network, as Figure 1
shows, it is a virtual composition of two components [44]:
● Encoder: This transforms the input (x) into a lowdimensional latent vector bottleneck, z =ƒ (x). Since the
latent vector is of low dimension, the encoder is forced
to learn only the most important features of the input
data.
● Decoder: This tries to recover the input from the latent
vector g(z)=x'. Although the latent vector has a low
dimension, it has a sufficient size (m < n) to allow the
decoder to recover the input data. Simultaneously, it
restricts the encoder function to approximate x so that it
is forced to learn only the most salient properties of x
without copying it exactly.

VAEs are the stochastic version of AEs as they can
describe the latent representation in probabilistic terms [45].
Instead of discrete values, there will be a probability
distribution for each latent attribute, making the latent space
continuous. This makes random sampling and interpolation
easier. In terms of structure, VAEs bear a resemblance to an
autoencoder; they are also made up of an encoder (also
known as recognition or inference model) and a decoder
(also known as a generative model). Both VAEs and
autoencoders attempt to reconstruct the input data while
learning the latent vector. However, unlike autoencoders, the
latent space of VAEs is continuous, and the decoder itself is
used as a generative model.
VAEs can be expressed as follow: the encoder q_ϕ (z|x)
where ϕ are the weights and biases of the network, x is the
input, and z is the latent space representation. Here, instead
of being a discrete value, the encoder output is a distribution
(for example, Gaussian) over the possible values of z, which
could have generated x.

FIGURE 2.

FIGURE 1.

Representation of an autoencoder.

The autoencoder can be trained by minimizing the loss
function known as the reconstruction error, L=(x, x'). It
measures the distance between the original input and its
reconstruction. It can be minimized in the usual way with
gradient descent and backpropagation. Popular loss
functions such as mean square error (MSE) or binary crossentropy (like cross-entropy, but with only two classes) can
be used as reconstruction errors, as in equation (1).
𝐿(𝑥, 𝑥 ′ ) = 𝑀𝑆𝐸 =

1
𝑚

′
∑𝑚
𝑖=1(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 )

(1)

The reconstruction error in the equation above is used as
an anomaly score for the autoencoders' fraud detection
implementation, as will be explained later in the
methodology.
B. VARIATIONAL AUTOENCODERS (VAEs)

By architecture, AEs tend to memorize the input, especially
if the dimension of the latent code is significantly bigger than
the number of features. To encourage the model to generalize
better, various techniques can be used, such as Denoising
AEs, Sparse AEs, or VAEs.
2

Variational autoencoder representation.

The VAE stochastically (randomly) samples z from the
distribution, then it sends the sample through the decoder p_θ
(x|z) where θ is the decoder weights and biases. The decoder
output, in turn, is a distribution over the possible
corresponding values of x, as Figure 2 shows.
By doing this kind of sampling from a distribution, VAEs
have two different types of losses. The first of these is the
Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL) between the probability
distribution q_ϕ (z|x) and the expected probability
distribution, p_θ (x|z). It measures how much information is
lost when q_ϕ (z|x) is used to represent p_θ (x|z) (in other
words, how close the two distributions are). It encourages the
autoencoder to explore different reconstructions. The second
is the reconstruction loss, which measures the difference
between the original input and its reconstruction. The more
they differ, the more it increases. Therefore, it encourages
the autoencoder to reconstruct the data better. These two
losses can be expressed as follows:
𝐿(𝜃, 𝜙; 𝑥) = −𝐷𝐾𝐿 (𝑞𝜙 (𝑧|𝑥)||𝑝𝜃 (𝑧)) + 𝐸𝑞𝜙 (𝑥) [𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑝𝜃 (𝑧)) ]
(2)

To implement this, the bottleneck layer will not directly
output the latent state variables. Instead, it will output two
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vectors, which describe the mean and variance of each latent
variable's distribution, as shown in Figure 3.
Once the mean and variance distributions are obtained, a
state z can be sampled from the latent variable distributions,
and it can be passed through the decoder for reconstruction.
However, this sampling process has one issue during training
such that Backpropagation gradients do not work over
random processes (stochastic layer) like the one described
above [46].
The solution to this problem is to push out the sampling
process as the input, which can be done by using an innovat-

FIGURE 3.

VAE sampling process.

ive technique, called the reparameterization trick. First, a
random vector ε is sampled, with the same dimensions as z
from a Gaussian distribution (the ε circle in the figure
below). Then, it is shifted by the latent distribution's mean μ,
and is subsequently scaled by the latent distribution's
variance σ, as shown in Figure 4 [47].

FIGURE 4. VAE

reparameterization trick.

By doing this, the random generator is omitted from the
backward pass, and the sampled data will have the properties
of the original distribution. The updated sampling process
now can be expressed as follows:
𝑧 = 𝜇 + 𝜎⨀𝜀
(3)
In the fraud detection domain, VAEs represent a powerful
technique. The encoder would produce a distribution of
possible encodings describing the transaction's essential
characteristics, yet it will keep the generalization intact.

2

C. GENERATIVE ADVERSARIAL NETWORKS (GANS)

GANs were introduced by Ian Goodfellow and his fellow
researchers at the University of Montreal in 2014 [48]. A
GAN consists of two neural networks, as Figure 5 shows
[49]:
● Generator: This is the generative model. It takes a
probability distribution (random noise) as input from a
latent space and tries to generate a realistic output
sample. Its purpose is similar to the decoder part of the
VAE.
● Discriminator: This is sometimes known as a “critic,”
which takes two alternating inputs: the real samples of
the training dataset or the generated fake samples from
the generator. It tries to determine whether the input
sample comes from the real samples or the generated
ones.

FIGURE 5.

The architecture of generative adversarial
network.

These two cooperating (and competing) networks are
trained together as one system wherein the discriminator
tries to get better at distinguishing between the real and fake
samples. The generator tries to output more realistic
examples to deceive the discriminator into thinking that the
generated example is real. That’s why it is called
“adversarial.” The system's ultimate goal is to make the
generator so good that the discriminator would not be able to
distinguish between the real and fake samples. Even though
the discriminator does classification, a GAN is still
unsupervised since it does not need labels for the samples.
The discriminator is a classification neural network, and it
can be trained the usual way by using gradient descent and
backpropagation. However, the training set is composed of
equal parts real and generated samples. Therefore, the loss
function can be minimized as follows:
𝐿(𝐷) (𝜃 (𝐺) , 𝜃 (𝐷) ) = −𝐸𝑥~𝑃𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐷(𝑥) − 𝐸𝑧
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (1 − 𝐷(𝐺(𝑧)))
(4)
The equation is just the standard binary cross-entropy cost
function. The loss is the negative sum of the expectation of
correctly identifying real data, D(x), and the expectation of
1.0 minus correctly identifying synthetic data, 1-D(G(z)).
GAN considers the total of the discriminator and generator
losses as a zero-sum game to train the generator. The
generator loss function is simply the negative of the
discriminator loss function [46]:
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𝑉 (𝐺) (𝜃 (𝐺) , 𝜃 (𝐷) ) = −𝐿(𝐷) (𝜃 (𝐺) , 𝜃 (𝐷) )

(5)

Thus, the GAN minimax loss objective function can be
written as [50]:

𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑉(𝐺, 𝐷) = 𝐸𝑥~𝑃𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐷(𝑥) +
𝐺
𝐷
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (1 − 𝐷(𝐺(𝑧)))

𝐸𝑧

(6)

The solution to the minimax game is called the Nash
equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium happens when one of the
actors does not change its action, regardless of what the other
actor may do. A Nash equilibrium in a GAN framework
happens when the generator becomes so good that the
discriminator is no longer able to distinguish between the
generated and real samples. However, the gradient descent
algorithm is designed to find the minimum of the loss
function rather than the Nash equilibrium. As a result,
sometimes the training may fail to converge, but, due to the
popularity of GANs, many improvements have been
proposed.
D. WASSERSTEIN GANS (WGANS)

GANs can be very difficult to train and are prone to mode
collapse. Mode collapse is when the generator produces
outputs that look the same even though the loss functions are
already optimized. Wasserstein GAN [46, 51] proposed an
implementation that can avoid a mode collapse issue; that is,
by replacing the GAN loss function based on the Wasserstein
1 or Earth-Mover distance (EMD). In our case, this is where
the “critic” discriminator is calculating the Wasserstein
distance between the real and fake samples. As the loss
function decreases in the training process, the Wasserstein
distance becomes smaller. Hence, the generator generates
samples closer to the real ones.

probability distribution p_data to match the probability
distribution p_g, as shown in Figure 6 [46]. Γ(x,y) is also
known as a transport plan to reflect the strategy for
transporting masses to match the two probability
distributions, which can be expressed as the following
equation:
𝑊(𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 , 𝑝𝑔 ) = 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝛾∈∏(𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎,𝑝𝑔 ) 𝐸(𝑥,𝑦)∼𝛾 [‖𝑥 − 𝑦‖]

(7)

When using EMD or Wasserstein 1 as the loss function, the
generator will try to minimize, while the discriminator tries
to maximize, it can be expressed as follow:
𝐿(𝐷) = −𝐸𝑥~𝑝

𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎

𝐷𝑤 (𝑥) + 𝐸𝑧 𝐷𝑤 (𝐺(𝑧))

𝐿(𝐺) = −𝐸𝑧 𝐷𝑤 (𝐺(𝑧))

(8)
(9)

In the generator loss function L(G), the first term disappears
since it is not directly optimizing with respect to the real data.
Moreover, the discriminator is not trying to tell whether the
samples are real or fake anymore. Instead, it is using KLipschitz function to calculate the Wasserstein distance
between the real and fake samples. As the loss function in
the training process decreases, the Wasserstein distance
becomes smaller. Hence, the generator generates samples
closer to the real ones [52], which can be described by:
𝑊(𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 , 𝑝𝑔 ) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑥~𝑝
𝑤∈𝑊

IV.

𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎

[𝐷𝑤 (𝑥)] − 𝐸𝑧 [𝐷𝑤 (𝐺(𝑧))] (10)

METHODOLOGY

This section explores the workflow that the research follows
towards the model implementation. It describes different
techniques and methods that have been used in each one of
these steps, such as the data preparation and preprocessing
techniques, model building, and performance evaluation.
A. WORKFLOW

FIGURE 6.

A pictorial representation of the Earth-Mover
distance computation [46].

The intuition behind EMD is that it measures how much
mass γ(x,y) should be transported by d = ‖x-y‖ for the
2

As shown in Figure 7, once the raw data is obtained, some
time is invested in understanding the data in order to describe
it and discover any underlying relations. Following this,
different data preprocessing techniques are used to prepare
the data for model training and evaluation. The output from
the data preprocessing is separated into two different
datasets. The first dataset, called “base,” is used to train and
test the autoencoder models (AE and VAE). AE has two
different versions: single-loss function and multi-loss
function.
The second dataset, called “merged,” is used to train and
test the WGAN model, which generates more fake fraud
transactions. These transactions are then mixed with the
merged dataset to produce the “mixed” dataset. Finally, the
mixed dataset is used to train the autoencoder models one
more time. The idea behind this approach is that by having
more fraud transactions, the model performance is expected
to increase, as will be explained later. All the models are then
compared using the different evaluation techniques to obtain
the best performing AE model.
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B. DATASET DESCRIPTION
1) RAW DATA

The data is obtained from the research project that was
undertaken in 2014 between the School of Computer
Science, University of Nottingham (Malaysia campus) and a

FIGURE 7. The workflow of the model implementation. The raw data is split into two segments: merged and base
datasets. The merged dataset is used as input for the WGAN model. The WGAN model produces and generates the
mixed dataset which is then used to train the AE and VAE models. The base dataset is used as input to train both
VAE and AE models. The AE model uses two loss functions, namely the multi-loss and single-loss function.

local Malaysian Bank. The original dataset that was obtained
in 2014 contains about 30 million transactions (records) for
the period from 2012 until 2013 [7]. However, for privacy
reasons, the full dataset is not accessible anymore. Instead,
this research obtained access to a subsection of the dataset as
summarized in Table 1.
TABLE I
RAW DATASET DESCRIPTION. THE RAW FINANCIAL TRANSATIONS ARE
PRE-PROCESSED ON DIFFERENT TIME HORIZONS, NAMELY DAY, WEEK, AND
MONTH.
Null
Name
Rec.
Attr. Normal
Fraud
Duplicates
Values
2

Day

2706

69

2661

45

3

0

Week

1490

71

1446

44

3

0

Month

693

71

649

44

2

0

The whole subsection dataset contains a total of 4889
transactions that are consolidated based on the time intervals
in 3 different files (Day, Week, and Month) and labeled
under the class attribute by a domain expert to be either (0 =
normal) or (1 = fraud). The number of attributes (or
“features”) varies between these groups based on the time
interval, as the Day group has 69 attributes including the
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class as it is the base time interval. In contrast, the other two
groups have two extra attributes with a total of 71 attributes.
These two extra attributes are (tran_date_to and Week), in
the case of the Week group, and (tran_date_to and Month),
in the case of the Month group.
The Day group has the most transactions, with a total of
2706 transactions, where 45 of them are fraud and the rest
are normal with only 3 Null values under the P2 attribute and
no duplicates. While the Week group has 1490 transactions,
44 of them are fraudulent ones, with three Null values under
the P2 attribute and no duplicates. Finally, the Month group
has 693 transactions, with 44 of them being fraud, two Null
values under the P2 attribute, and no duplicates. In this
research, the Day group is used as the base dataset, as it has
the most normal transactions that will be required to train the
autoencoders model and it requires less preprocessing work.
2) MERGED DATA

We notice from the dataset above that it does contain
sufficient fraudulent transactions. However, training the
WGAN model requires enough fraud transactions to produce
more realistic fraud transactions in turn.
Therefore, to obtain enough transactions to train the
WGAN, the three groups of the dataset in Table 1 are merged
into one dataset. However, two issues need to be solved to
perform this merging successfully. The first issue is that
different datasets have different numbers of attributes. The
Week and Month datasets have two extra attributes - one
attribute is the time interval, and the other attribute is the
ending date for that interval, as mentioned above. To solve
this issue, the time interval will be reconstructed into the base
unit for all three datasets, which will require feature
engineering for the transaction date tran_date attribute that
will be discussed in the next section. Therefore, the
(tran_date_from and Week) attributes will be dropped from
the Week dataset. Also, the (tran_date_from and Month)
attributes equally will be removed from the Month dataset
while keeping the tran_date_to attribute
TABLE II
MERGED DATASET DESCRIPTION. THE NEW DATASET IS SORTED AND REINDEXED AFTER THE DATASETS ARE MERGED. THE DATASET CONTAINS 133
FRAUD TRANSACTIONS, AND, AS IT WAS EXPECTED, 7 DUPLICATES WERE
FOUND.
Nor
Null
Name
Rec.
Attr.
Fraud
Duplicates
mal
Values
Merged

4889

69

4756

133

8

7

since it represents the end of the time interval for both
datasets. Thus, the processed datasets will have equally 69
attributes and can be merged.
The second issue is the possibility of having duplicates.
However, this issue will be discussed and solved in the next
section. Table 2 summarizes the merged dataset. After the
datasets are merged, the new dataset is sorted and re-indexed.
The dataset now contains 133 fraud transactions, and as was
expected, seven duplicates were found, which will be
handled next.
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C. DATA PREPROCESSING
Data preprocessing is one of the key steps towards any
successful machine learning implementation. It helps to
remove the noise data and irrelevant information from the
dataset that prevents the knowledge discovery and can hurt
the generalization. In the next sections, we will cover some
of the data preprocessing techniques such as transformation,
normalization, data cleaning, and feature extraction that were
implemented in this research.
1) FEATURE DROPPING

This is the first technique that can help in dimension
reduction. Keeping irrelevant attributes could hurt the model
performance and cause overfitting, but by removing the
unnecessary or redundant features, the model is expected to
perform and generalize better. It will also help cut down the
computing power required to train and run the model. In this
research, two techniques were used to identify such features
in the dataset: zero-sum and automatic generated.
Attributes that have the same value for every record
instance do not add any extra knowledge to the model as it
cannot enhance the prediction; rather, it can hurt the model.
Significantly, if the total value for that attribute for the whole
dataset is zero, this attribute is dropped during the data
preprocessing step. This is the case for some features in the
dataset such as (rl0003, rl0012, rl0013, rl0014, etc.).
There are two attributes directly related to the customer in
the given dataset. These two features are customer identifier,
cif_id, and account number, account_no. The bank system
automatically generates both these attributes. Some fraud
detection implementations are mainly built on such attributes
as the graph analysis and the social network analysis, where
the customer account number is considered to be a ‘node’
and his transaction an ‘edge’. Then certain weights and
techniques are applied to evaluate whether this account is
doing money laundering or not.
However, these implementations require the account that
the transaction was sent from and the account that the
transaction will be sent to. Unfortunately, the given dataset
does not provide these attributes. Also, in terms of
implementation for this research, including these customerrelated features will have a negative impact on the model
performance. The model will be used as a real-time fraud
detection system during the inference phase, where even a
single transaction can be evaluated from a totally new
customer. Therefore, during the model training no customerspecific features will be included and both attributes are
removed from the dataset.
2) DUPLICATE DROPPING

Even though the groups that were mentioned in Table 1 do
not have duplicates, when these groups are combined
together in the merged dataset, some duplicates were found.
Hence, we check for duplicates in the merged dataset and
drop them.
However, it is worth pointing out that the duplicates that
have been dropped from the dataset have occurred because
of the merging process. In other cases where duplicates
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represent an original part of the dataset, it is still acceptable
to keep them.
3) BINARY ENCODING

Categorical attributes need to be converted into numbers,
so the model will be able to work with them, and there are
different types of encoding techniques. Among the most
popular ones are One Hot Encoding and Binary Encoding.
We compare these two encoding techniques in terms of their
impact on the model accuracy and the number of output
attributes that each technique produces. Binary Encoding
will have the same impact on the model accuracy as One Hot
Encoding but with less attributes, which is sufficient for this
research. Three attributes (account_type, product_type,
business_type) in the dataset need to be encoded. The binary
encoder will encode the categories in each one of these
attributes into binary code then split it into columns.

7) FEATURE ENGINEERING ON DATES

One reason for having the raw dataset divided into three
groups is to enhance the model accuracy by grouping the
transactions within a specific period. Although this is still a
valid approach, it can be improved even further.
This research introduces another approach that can better
use the date attribute, engineering some new features based
on the tran_date feature. Specifically, the tran_date feature is
split into its base date components, then these new features
are added into the dataset. These new features are described
in Table 3.

4) NULL VALUES

Having null or missing values in the dataset can lead to
wrong predictions or even issues during model training.
Therefore, filling these values is an important step during the
preprocessing phase. In the given dataset, eight null values
were found under the P2 attribute. These null values were
handled by filling them with the mean attribute value.

𝑋–𝜇

(12)
𝜎
The standardization technique was applied over all the
non-binary attributes in the dataset (credit_amount,
debit_amount, p2,…, etc.).
𝑍=

Feature
month
day
quarter
dayofweek
is_weekend

TABLE III
DATE-BASED NEW FEATURES
Description
Month of the transaction
Day of the transaction relative to the month
Quarter of the year (1~ 4) of the transaction
Day of the week of the transaction
Whether the transaction occurred during the
weekend or not

5) LOG TRANSFORMATION

Data skew represents another challenge that needs to be
fixed. Three attributes in the given dataset (credit_amount,
debit_amount, debitpluscredit_amount) show an extensive
range of differences within their values because the vast
majority of the values are skewed towards a certain direction
while the remaining few are skewed in the other direction.
By applying the common scaling techniques directly to such
attributes, the scaled data will not preserve the original data
representation. Therefore, log transformation is required to
fix the data skew as it pulled in the extremely high values
relative to the median while stretching the low values back
further away from the median. Moreover, the log
transformation respects the positivity of the attribute, which
is essential for the scaling techniques that will be applied to
the data. By applying log transformation on the attributes,
their distribution takes a better shape.

The idea behind introducing these features is to allow the
model to capture any pattern within the data that is related to
its date. As shown in Figure 8, transactions tend to have
different data peaks from one feature to another, which the
model may utilize to identify fraudulent behavior.

6) STANDARDIZATION

As the dataset contains a wide range of values, the
normalization or standardization of data prior to the training
phase is favorable because it can reduce the estimation errors
and calculation time.
Normalization, which is also called Min-Max Scaling, can
be achieved by scaling the attribute to a fixed range (0 and
1) through this equation:
𝑋 – 𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 =
(11)
𝑋
–𝑋
𝑚𝑎𝑥

𝑚𝑖𝑛

However, in fraud detection models, it is important to
preserve the original distance between data points.
Therefore, standardization will be much more appropriate
for implementation. Standardization scales the data based on
its mean (𝜇 ) and the standard deviation (𝜎 ) from the mean.
Having 𝜇 = 0 and 𝜎 = 1 will center the data around 0 as
in the following equation:
VOLUME XX, 2017

FIGURE 8. Data distribution for the new date related
features based on different time horizons (i.e., day,
month, and quarterly). The y-axis represents the density
and the x-axis represents the range of values.

However, the given dataset does not provide any
timestamp features. It could be instrumental in deducing
even more information, such as whether the transaction
occurred during daytime, night, morning, or afternoon,
which may be useful for the model.
It is worth mentioning that there is a popular deep learning
implementation that can handle time-series data and
sequence data better than the non-recurrent neural networks,
which is called LSTM (Long Short-Term Memory).
However, this approach is not useful for this research
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because fraud behavior does not follow a particular
sequence; one transaction cannot be used to predict the next
one. Moreover, this research aims to build a real-time fraud
detection application that may operate on one transaction
rather than a batch of transactions.
D. PREPROCESSED DATASET

The preprocessing phase outputs two datasets; the base
dataset will be used to train the autoencoder models, and the
merged dataset used to train the WGAN. This section
describes these two datasets as they are now ready to be used.
Table 4 shows the description of these datasets.
The different number of attributes in the two datasets are
due to one extra attribute, rl0030, that was dropped from the
base dataset because it has a zero-sum value. However, this

attribute holds some value for instances in the other two
groups when the groups are merged together. Although the
number of Fraud transactions is low compared to the normal
transactions in the base dataset, the autoencoder
implementation will overcome this issue. As the WGAN will
need the fraud transactions for the training, the merged
dataset is used as it has more fraud transactions than the base
dataset.

Name
Base
Merged

TABLE IV
PROCESSED BASE AND MERGED DATASETS
Null
Rec.
Attr. Normal
Fraud
Values
2706
43
2661
45
0
4882
44
4749
133
0

Duplicates
0
0

FIGURE 9. Attributes

distribution by class (Normal and Fraud). The y-axis represents the fraction of transactions, and
the x-axis represents the time horizons (i.e., quarter, month, day, dayofweek etc.)

FIGURE 10.

VOLUME XX, 2017

Attributes distribution by class (Normal and Fraud). Normal transactions are represented as ‘blue’
whereas fraud transactions are represented as ‘orange’
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In both datasets, fraud and normal transactions are
overlapped in almost every feature, except in certain features
such
as
credit_amount,
debit_amount,
and
depitpluscredit_amount, where fraud and normal
transactions can be slightly separable, as Figure 10 shows.
Nevertheless, when these barely separable features are
investigated further, their distribution shows a high level of
mixing, as Figure 9 shows in the case of credit_amount.
Therefore, a machine learning implementation is necessary
for better normal-fraud class classification.
E. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION
1) AE

The autoencoder is mainly used to learn the important
features; then, it utilizes that knowledge to reconstruct the
data to be as similar as possible to the original data.
However, in fraud detection implementation, the
autoencoder's output is not the focus. Instead, the most
important part is the knowledge that the model gains in the
latent vector. That knowledge can be evaluated through the
reconstruction error, as mentioned earlier.
In this implementation, the autoencoder will be only
trained over the normal transactions. Thus, the model is
expected to learn the normal transactions’ important features
and then reconstruct these transactions. However, during the
testing phase, the model will be tested against both normal
and fraud transactions. That’s when the reconstruction error
is used. If the tested transaction is normal the model will be
able to reconstruct it with the minimum error. However, if
the transaction is fraud, the reconstruction error will be
relatively significant. Moreover, to determine whether the
error is big or small, a predetermined threshold value is used,
on which the anomaly score is given to each transaction. The
threshold determination method will be discussed in the next
sections.
MODEL ARCHITECTURE

The first component in the autoencoder implementation is
the input layer, Model_Input, which has 42 neurons. Each
neuron represents one attribute in the base dataset except the
class attribute. No activation function is used for this layer as
no prior weights exist; hence, it merely passes the values to
the network's next component.

The next component of the network is the encoder. It
consists of 3 dense layers (Encode_1, Encode_2, Encode_3),
and the number of neurons in each one is almost half of the
number of its previous layer. Thus the autoencoder is forced
to learn only the important features. The bottleneck layer is
the next component; it has the minimum number of neurons,
which is eight, that will hold the latent vector weights.
Then, the network passes the values to the decoder, which
in turn consists of three dense layers (Decode_1, Decode_2,
Decode_3). However, the number of neurons in each dense
layer in the decoder is almost double the number of its
previous layer to build towards restoring the same number of
features as the original data. The last component of the
network is the Model_Output layer, which has 42 neurons
representing the same number of neurons as the original
input. Figure 11 shows the architecture of the AE model.
The activation function in the first layer in both the
encoder and the decoder is tanh as it will ensure the output
values for neurons in these layers will always be between (1, 1). This fits nicely because of the data standardization in
the preprocessing phase. The other layers in both of these
components use the ReLU activation function, which will
force the output to be positive, or else zero. Finally, a
sigmoid activation function in the Model_Output layer will
produce output within the range of (0, 1).
The model uses Mean Squared Error (MSE) as a loss
function as most of the input values are a spectrum rather
than binary. The MSE computes the average of the square
difference between the actual input value and the predicted
value. Therefore, the objective of the optimizer is to
minimize that loss function. The output of MSE is a positive
value. However, as sigmoid was used as an activation
function in the last layer of the autoencoder, it is expected to
have a Binary Cross-Entropy (BCE) loss, which will be
discussed in the next section.
Lastly, the gradient-based optimization optimizer Adam is
used by the model to minimize the loss function as it is
invariant to the gradients' diagonal rescaling and capable of
handling a wide range of nosiy data.
MULTI-LOSS FUNCTION

Given that the input features have both binary and nonbinary data, and sigmoid is used as the model output
activation function, this paper implemented another variant
of the AE model. Instead of having one loss function, this
variant has two loss functions, MSE and BCE. BCE is
capable of handling the binary values and has a bounded
output of [0,1]. The idea of combining these two losses is to
have a smooth and stable loss value that will handle both
binary and non-binary values during the optimization. The
implementation adds these two losses then returns their mean
value.
TRAINING AND HYPERPARAMETERS TUNING

FIGURE 11.
VOLUME XX, 2017

Several experiments have been undertaken to determine the
values of the hyperparameters (such as the learning rate,

Autoencoder model structure.
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number of epochs, etc.). After reaching a stable performance,
the learning rate value, which determines the gradient
optimizer's step size, is set to be (1e-3), and the number of
epochs is set to be 300. To optimize the training process, an
early stopping technique is used to terminate the training if
the loss does not decrease beyond 1e-5.
As the dataset is not large enough, we used a crossvalidation technique where 20% of the data is used for
testing, and 80% is used in the training process. Each batch
size is set to be 80, selected based on a random seed. Finally,
to avoid the network’s tendency to memorize the training
data and fail to generalize, the model uses an activity
regularizer in the encoder's first layer. This allows the
application of penalties over this layer during the
optimization and adds those penalties to the loss function.

Decode_2), and the number of neurons in each of them is and
12 and 22, respectively. Finally, the Model_Output layer
receives the decoded values and outputs 42 features. In
general, the model uses the ReLU activation function in both
the encoder and the decoder layers. Figure 12 shows the
architecture of the VAE model.

2) VAE

The variational autoencoder follows the same idea for
implementation as for the AE. That is, only the normal
transactions are used during the training phase. Then an
anomaly score is assigned with each transaction during the
test phase for both normal and fraud transactions by
comparing the reconstruction loss against a predefined
threshold. The difference between VAE and AE is the latent
space; as in VAE, it is represented by a distribution rather
than data values.
MODEL ARCHITECTURE FOR VAE

The model starts with the input layer Model_Input, which
has 42 neurons with no activation function, and the encoder,
consisting of two dense layers (Encode_1, Encode_2) where
they have (22 and 12) neurons, respectively. The Encode_2
layer, in turn, outputs two different vectors, Mean and Log
Variance. Each one of these two vectors is mapped to its own
layer. Log Variance here is used because of its more
numerical stability than the standard deviation, which will be
calculated later in the Sigma layer.
However, before recovering the standard deviation in the
Sigma-dense layer, both Mean and Log Variance are passed
to a custom layer, KLDivergenceLayer. This layer calculates
the distribution loss using a KL divergence function, then
adds this loss to the total model loss. Finally, it returns the
inputs (Mean and Log Variance) unchanged to the next layer.
Next, the Sigma-dense layer receives the values from
KLDivergenceLayer and recovers the Standard Deviation.
Subsequently, we implemented the reparameterization trick
by introducing a separate dense layer, Epsilon, which uses
the Monte Carlo sampling technique to draw a random
sample from a normal distribution with the same latent
vector dimension. This sample represents Noise, which is
then multiplied by Sigma, and the product is forwarded to
the next layer.
The latent space Z-dense layer receives the sampled vector
standard deviation multiplied by epsilon and also receives
the Mean from KLDivergenceLayer. Then it adds them
together and outputs the result to the model decoder. The
decoder consists of two dense layers: (Decode_1,
VOLUME XX, 2017

FIGURE 12.

VAE model architecture.

TRAINING AND HYPERPARAMETERS TUNING FOR
VAE

The initial learning rate is set to be (1e-3), while the model
will be trained for 300 epochs. Cross-validation is used
where training and test datasets correspond to 80% and 20%
of the original dataset, and batch size is set to be 128.
The RMSprop optimizer is used to minimize the loss
function because it limits the vertical direction fluctuations.
This allows increasing the learning rate, allowing the
gradient to take larger steps for faster convergence.
3) WGAN

The fraud detection models' problem is that their datasets are
always unbalanced, given that the fraud behavior
infrequently occurs. The same case applies to the merged
dataset as it has only 133 fraud transactions. Therefore,
WGAN will generate more fraud transactions, enhancing or
solving the unbalanced dataset problem, hence enhancing the
model’s performance.
As the model will generate fraud transactions, the merged
dataset is used to train the model. After the training is done,
the model is used to generate new fraud transactions. These
newly generated fraud transactions are mixed with the
dataset to formulate the mixed dataset.
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MODEL ARCHITECTURE FOR WGAN

As training GANs is not easy in terms of stability [50], the
model implementation considers that adding extra layers
such as the Dropout layer and the LeakyReLU activation
layer could make the model more stable.
In general, the model starts with the Model_Input layer,
which receives 43 features mapped to its 43 neurons. Then
the model separated into two different networks: one is the

transactions are the same (i.e., 43 features). Hence, the
number of neurons in this layer is 43 as well.
The discriminator consists of 3 dense layers (Disc_1,
Disc_2, Disc_3) beside the Model_Output layer. The dense
layers are based on the binary system where the number of
neurons is 512, 256, and 128, respectively. The output layer
will have only one neuron. The same technique of using
LeakyReLu is used here, so each dense layer except the
output is followed by the LeakyReLU activation layer.
Moreover, to solve the problem of overfitting and stability
issue, a Dropout layer is added after the first dense layer
activation, which could help to regularize the network.
Finally, the discriminator output layer, Model_Output, has
no activation function as it is implementing the Wasserstein
distance. It will use the single neuron in the layer to output
the distance of which the transaction is considered real or
fake, rather than outputting 0 or 1, using a classic activation
function such as Sigmoid. Figure 13 shows the architecture
of the WGAN model.
TRAINING AND HYPERPARAMETERS TUNING FOR
WGAN

FIGURE 13.

WGAN model architecture.

generator, and the other one is the discriminator. The
generator network has three dense layers (Gen_1, Gen_2,
Gen_3) plus the Gen_Out layer. Because the generator
generates fake transactions, it does not need to follow a
specific structure in each layer's neuron number. However,
as almost all GANs literature is based on image processing,
it follows a binary multiplication system. To follow that
practice in this network, the number of neurons in the
generator layers are 128, 256, and 512, respectively.
However, for the Gen_Out layer, the number of neurons is
43, as it will be the same number of features as the real
transaction.
After each layer in the generator except for Gen_Out, there
is a LeakyReLu activation layer that replaces the standard
layer activation and could handle values better than the
standard ReLU.
The discriminator network, on the other hand, starts with
the Mixed_Input layer receiving input from both the
generator, which will produce the fake transactions and also
a randomly selected batch from the real transactions. These
two sources are then mixed and passed to the next layers. The
dimensions of the generated fake transactions and the real
VOLUME XX, 2017

GANs require a relatively long time to converge. Hence the
number of epochs is set to be 50,000. The optimizer is set to
be Adam with a learning rate of about (1e-3). The batch size
for the real transactions' random sample is set to be 64, which
the discriminator will use.
Moreover, a checkpoint is made to save the model and
weights in every 100 epochs in addition to the loss values.
Once training is done, an accuracy check iterates over all
checkpoints to select the best version in terms of accuracy
relative to its corresponding loss.
It is worth mentioning that the LeakyReLU layers have a
hyper-parameter, called alpha, that determines the curve's
negative slope. Here alpha is set to be 0.2, and the Dropout
rate is set to be 0.1.
F. Performance Evaluation Methods

Various measures are used to evaluate the performance of
proposed models. We start with a list of related terms that
will be used in these measures. False positive (FP) refers to
the number of normal transactions that are predicted as fraud.
True positive (TP) is the number of fraud transactions that
are predicted as fraud. False negative (FN) specifies the
number of fraud transactions that are predicted as normal.
Finally, true negative (TN) refers to the number of normal
transactions that are predicted as normal.
In this research, a confusion matrix is used to report the
model performance by combining the indicators mentioned
above. This will help visualize how the model confuses the
true class. Moreover, some other performance measures will
be calculated using the confusion matrix, such as FP rate
(FPR), accuracy (ACC), precision, recall, F1 score, and
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve.
FPR is highly important in fraud detection models,
especially in this research, as it aims to minimize the value
of FPR as much as possible. It is expressed as follows:
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𝐹𝑃𝑅 =

𝐹𝑃

(13)

𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃

Accuracy indicates the overall correct predicted
transactions, whether it is TP or TN relative to the total
instances. Precision identifies the correct fraud transactions
rate relative to all transactions that are predicted as fraud.
The recall is the rate of the correctly predicted fraud
transactions relative to all of the actual fraud transactions. To
summarize the model with only one single score, the F1
score is used as it considers both recall and precision in its
formula as follow:
𝐹1 = 2 ×

𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙

(14)

𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙

It is worthwhile to mention that both the Precision and F1
scores are relatively low in fraud detection models as the
number of FPs is always more prominent than the TPs.
Finally, ROC is used to visualize the True Positive Rate
(TPR) and the FPR, and both are plotted on the y-axis and xaxis, respectively. Hence, it shows how the model reacts
under all different combinations of thresholds.
An important indicator is calculated from ROC and called
Area Under the Curve (AUC). AUC summarizes the whole
model performance in one number, ranging from 0 to 1 with
the best performance equal 1.
The optimizer’s objective is to minimize the loss.
However, this could lead to overfitting. Two model losses,
such as Training Loss and Testing Loss, are reported to make
sure that the model is not overfitting. Suppose the Training
Loss is higher than the Testing Loss. In that case, the model
is underfitting, and there is room for enhancement until the
Training Loss is near or equal to the Testing Loss - which is
perfect fitting. Once the Testing Loss exceeds the Training
Loss, the model is overfitting, and it needs to be adjusted.
THRESHOLD OPTIMIZATION

As was mentioned before, fraud detection implementations
require a predefined Threshold value to be able to assign an
anomaly score to each transaction. However, given the
business scope of these implementations, they should filter
out all of the fraud transactions. Yet, they should maintain a
good degree of efficiency by targeting a low FP rate.
To automate the process of determining the Threshold, and
at the same time, aligned with the business scope target, this
research defines the Threshold to be Recall-First Threshold
(RFT). The Recall-First Threshold (RFT), is the value that
will allow the recall of all fraud transactions with the highest
precision possible, as Figure 14 shows. This can be used
perfectly as a Threshold for our fraud detection
implementation as its required to filter out all of the fraud
transactions; nevertheless, it should maintain a good degree
of efficiency by targeting low FP rate.
To calculate the RFT, precision-recall pairs for different
probability thresholds are computed using the
precision_recall_curve function in the sklearn library. Then
the minimum value in the returned thresholds array is
selected.

VOLUME XX, 2017

Figure 14.

Recall-First threshold.

VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This section presents the results from different
experiments. Firstly, it describes the mixed dataset, which is
the result of the WGAN model. Secondly, it compares the
AE model (single-loss and multi-loss) and VAE model under
both datasets (Base and Mixed). Finally, the section
concludes with a discussion of each model’s performance
using each dataset.
A. WGAN

WGAN training process is relatively tricky, and it often
requires a significant number of epochs. Hence, the WGAN
model with the configuration detailed in the previous section
shows various accuracy levels during the training process, as
Figure 15 shows. The accuracy refers to how much the
generated samples are identical to the real samples. Thus,
higher accuracy is an indication that the discriminator is no
longer able to distinguish between the generated and real
samples. During training, a checkpoint is saved for the
model, and once the training is completed, an iteration is
used to select the best version of the model based on its
accuracy, which reached 99%. The optimal number of
iterations is chosen when the accuracy has reached a plateau
or degradation.
After training, the best model is utilized to generate fraud
transactions. Specifically, it is used to generate about the
same number of real fraud transactions in the merged dataset;
that is, about 132 fraud transactions. These fake fraud
transactions are then mixed into the merged dataset to result
in the mixed dataset, as Table 5 shows.

Name

Rec.

Mixed

501
4

TABLE V
MIXED DATASET DESCRIPTION
Null
Attr.
Normal
Fraud
Values
44

4749

265

0

Duplicates
0

Subsequently, the mixed dataset is re-indexed and sorted
to be used during the autoencoder models training, and the
final dataset is shown in Figure 16.
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B. AE SINGLE-LOSS (AE-S)

The autoencoder model with a single loss function (MSE)
training generally shows an acceptable fitting level. The
Training Loss stayed above but near the Testing Loss using
the base dataset. On the contrary, the Training Loss goes
below but near the Testing Loss when the mixed dataset is
used, indicating a sort of overfitting, as Figure 17 shows.
When the base dataset is used, the Recall-First Threshold
(RFT) was 0.216, which increased to reach 0.589 after the

mixed dataset is used, as Figure 18 shows. The AUC was
calculated to be 0.920 in the base dataset. However, it
increased to reach about 0.963 once the mixed dataset is
used, as shown in Figure 19.
As the RFT is already calculated, the reconstruction error
can be assigned an anomaly score, as Figure 21 shows. All
of the reconstruction error values located above the RFT are
considered fraud; else, it is considered normal. However, the
different color represents the actual points class.

FIGURE 15. WGAN

classification accuracy at different epochs during training of the credit_amount attribute. The left
side shows the distribution of the real dataset while the three remaining right sides show the distribution of the
generated synthetic data for different epochs (i.e., 100, 200, and 300). It can be observed that the distribution of the
synthetic data is very similar to the real dataset.

VOLUME XX, 2017
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FIGURE 16. Credit_amount

feature distribution in the mixed dataset by class (Normal and Fraud).

FIGURE 17. AE-S

FIGURE 18. AE-S

VOLUME XX, 2017

model loss.

recall-first threshold. The precision/recall value is between 0 and 1.
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FIGURE 19. AE-S

receiver operating characteristic curve and AUC.

Finally, the confusion matrix is depicted in Figure 20,
based on the fraud scores assigned in the above step. All
fraud transactions are identified correctly, which makes the
recall 100% for the base dataset. The same goes for the
mixed dataset, where all of the 43 fraud transactions are
identified correctly.
However, the number of normal transactions that are
incorrectly predicted as fraud was about 94 transactions in
the base dataset, while decreased to 69 transactions after
using the mixed dataset. Moreover, these predictions
impacted other measures, such as the FPR, which reached
0.18 when the based dataset was used against 0.07 when the
mixed dataset was used. In general, all of the measures are
reported in Table 6.
C. AE MULTI-LOSS (AE-M)

As was proposed by this research, the AE-M uses both crossentropy and MSE loss functions to evaluate the model loss.
Results show that the model has a perfect fitting in the base
dataset case as Training Loss and Testing Loss

FIGURE 21. AE-S

VOLUME XX, 2017

FIGURE 20. AE-S

confusion matrix.

are positioned over each other. However, it was relatively
over-fitted in the mixed dataset case, as Training Loss went
below the Testing Loss, as Figure 22 shows. The RFT scored
about 0.229 when the base dataset was used, while it scored
0.554 when the mixed dataset was used, as Figure 23 shows.
AUC was lower in the base dataset than the mixed dataset
case, as it is reported to be 0.915 and 0.965, respectively,
shown in Figure 24.

reconstruction error fraud-score. The reconstruction error is between 0 and 25.
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FIGURE 22. AE-M

FIGURE 23. AE-M Recall-First threshold. The

FIGURE 24. AE-M

VOLUME XX, 2017

model loss.

precision/recall value is between 0 and 1.

receiver operating characteristic curve and AUC.
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FIGURE 25. AE-M

reconstruction error fraud-score. The reconstruction error is between 0 and 25.

FIGURE 26. VAE

FIGURE 27. AE-M

confusion matrix

FIGURE 28. VAE

VOLUME XX, 2017

model loss.
When AE-M is used to classify the transactions based on
their reconstruction error score against the calculated RFT
value, results shows that the distribution of the error points
was scattered in the base dataset compared to the mixed
dataset case, as shown in Figure 25. After the fraud scores
were assigned to the transactions, the confusion matrix in
Figure 27 is constructed. In both datasets, all the fraud
transactions were recalled correctly. In contrast, 100
normal transactions were predicted as frauds in the base
dataset case, and 67 normal transactions were incorrectly

recall-first threshold. The precision/recall value is between 0 and 1.
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.
FIGURE 29. VAE

receiver operating characteristic curve and AUC.

FIGURE 30. VAE

reconstruction error fraud-score.

classified for the mixed dataset as well, as Figure 27 shows.
Among other performance measures that are detailed in
Table 6, FPR scored about 0.19 in the base dataset case while
it scored 0.07 in the mixed dataset case.
D. VAE

Variational autoencoder showed perfect fitting in the base
dataset case, yet the Training Loss went below the Testing
Loss when the mixed dataset was used. Hence, it is
overfitting, as Figure 26 shows. The RFT was calculated to
be 0.202 for the base dataset and 0.552 for the mixed dataset
to assign fraud scores to the predicted transactions, as shown
in Figure 28.
As Figure 29 shows, AUC reached as high as 0.9645 when
the mixed dataset was used, while it decreased to reach
0.9057 when the base dataset was used. Based on the RFT
computed value, the fraud score was assigned, showing that
the reconstruction error points are more condensed under the
threshold when the mixed dataset was used. In

VOLUME XX, 2017

FIGURE 31. VAE

confusion matrix.

contrast, they were scattered under the threshold when the
based dataset was used, as Figure 30 shows.
Lastly, the confusion matrix was assembled based on the
RFT, where it shows that all the fraud transactions were
correctly predicted in both datasets. Moreover, the
incorrectly predicted normal transactions decreased from
101 transactions for the base dataset experiment to be 75
transactions in the mixed dataset experiment, as depicted in
Figure 31.
Accordingly, FPR decreased from 0.19 in the base dataset
to about 0.08 in the mixed dataset experiment. Table 6 shows
a summary of all the performance results in the next section.
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E. DISCUSSIONS

The mixed dataset shows a better performance in almost
every measure, and Table 6 shows the overall indicators in
percentage for comparison.
The FPR dropped drastically from around 19% for the base
dataset to around 8% for the mixed dataset. This was
expected as the number of fraud class transactions in the
mixed dataset is almost double. However, the interesting part
is that the FP number itself decreased in nearly all
experiments, which implies a better model's ability to
separate the fraud class from the normal class. The reason for
this is that the shape of the reconstruction error distribution
that was nicely flattened under the threshold line. Moreover,
the proposed threshold (RFT) proved to be a good estimate,
as its value was almost doubled from around 0.2 for the base
dataset, reaching approximately 0.5 in the mixed dataset
case. This increased the model's ability to cover a broader
range of the reconstruction error.
In anomaly detection research, a highly unbalanced dataset
is always the case, which impacts the performance of certain
measures such as precision and accordingly F1 measure; that
is, the precision considers the FP count relative to the true
positive count. Thus, although the result shows a better
precision and F1 measure in the mixed dataset, reaching
around 39% and 56%, respectively, these values are still low
compared to other studies that are not in the anomaly
detection domain. The better alternatives to the F1 measure
that can be used in the anomaly detection field are ROC and
AUC as the TP/FP ratio issue does not impact them.
Therefore, we obtained an AUC value of 96.50% in the
mixed dataset, which is still comparable across different
research domains.
TABLE VI
OVERALL PERFORMANCE RESULTS IN PERCENTAGE FOR BOTH
DATASETS. THE RESULTS SHOW THE MEAN OF RETURNS AVERAGED
OVER SIX RUNS. THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS NOT REPORTED SINCE THE
VARIATION IS INSIGNIFICANT (STD LESS THAN 0.01).
Name

Acc.

Precision

Recall

F1

AUC

FPR

Base
AE-S

83

10

100

19

92.00

18

AE-M
VAE
Mixed

82
81

10
10

100
100

18
18

91.50
90.57

19
19

AE-S

93

38

100

55

96.30

7

AE-M
VAE

93
93

39
36

100
100

56
53

96.50
96.45

7
8

The proposed approach of having a multi-loss function for
the autoencoder model shows the best overall result with the
mixed dataset, as its FPR went as low as 7%, while its AUC
scored 96.50%.
Although the proposed models' overall performance and
results were good, some minor overfitting was reported in
the mixed dataset even after applying cross-validation,
regularization, and dropout techniques. Solving this issue
may require access to a bigger dataset. However, in this
VOLUME XX, 2017

research, the implementation is mainly focused on the latent
vector and the reconstruction error rather than the actual
output of the model. Hence, minor overfitting is not expected
to have an impact on the model's overall performance.
In this paper, we have designed and implemented a deep
learning model that gives state-of-the-art results, in terms of
the FPR, RFT, and AUC, for improving the anti-money
laundering (AML) process. We also explored recent state-ofthe-art deep learning and unsupervised learning techniques
such as autoencoder (AE), variational autoencoder (VAE),
and generative adversarial network (GAN), and we showed
that these techniques can enhance earlier results [7, 8].
Recent works such as Pumsirirat and Yan [42] and Paula
et al. [43] both used autoencoders (AEs) to investigate fraud
and money laundering. However, for the first time, we
demonstrate the applicability and effectiveness of combining
AE and VAE with WGAN methods. We use WGAN to
generate realistic synthetic fraud transactions to solve the
issue of imbalanced class labels, and such additional
transactions are then used by the AE/VAE to train the model.
Our results indicate that this approach achieves significant
improvements for fraud detection.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

Money laundering is a serious global issue that needs to be
addressed, especially considering the fast-growing datasets
that need to be evaluated and analyzed. This research
attempted to extend the work previously started in 2014 by
applying deep learning and unsupervised techniques to
improve the anti-money laundering process. More
specifically, our system leveraged AE and VAE models.
However, as access to the whole dataset is not available
anymore, the current study relied on another advanced
technique in deep learning called GAN to generate more
fraud transactions to produce more reliable models.
To obtain a more balanced dataset, WGAN was used to
generate more fraud transactions, which were mixed with the
base dataset to produce the mixed dataset. This was then used
to train the autoencoders. WGAN performance scored a very
high accuracy, reaching about 99%. Hence, the generated
fraud transactions were almost identical to the real fraud
transactions.
Experimental results show that even with the base dataset,
the proposed models performed better than the original
research as it helped decrease the FPR to reach around 18%.
However, using the mixed dataset, the results were even
better as the FPR was reduced to 7%. Other measures were
enhanced, such as accuracy, which increased to 93%, and
AUC, which reached 96.50%. Results also show that the
proposed multi-loss function autoencoder performed better
than the other models.
It is worth mentioning that the model’s loss in the mixed
dataset case was slightly over-fitted. Hence, additional data
may be required to overcome this issue in the future.
However, as this implementation mainly focused on the
latent vector and the reconstruction error rather than the
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actual output of the models, minor overfitting is not expected
to impact the model's overall performance.
Money laundering inherently possesses complicated
characteristics, for example, the layering phase in which
launderers distribute money between the different accounts
while trying to hide their sources. Capturing such a pattern
will require additional work such as the graph and social
network analysis along with the deep learning and
unsupervised techniques proposed by this study.
Despite the promising results, there is still some space for
enhancement. This could be achieved if access to a bigger
dataset is secured along with an in-depth interpretation for
the dataset attributes.
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